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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Newly discovered fingerprint evidence, which indicates that 
fingerprints found on a shoe box handled by the suspect 
immediately prior to the crime do not match the fingerprints of 
Appellant Michael Ray Anderson [uMr. Anderson"] , renders xx"a 
different result probable on the retrial of this case.'" State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994)(citation omitted). The 
State's argument that the evidence is not reliable due to 
contamination is not supported by the record, which does not 
establish that the evidence was contaminated or otherwise 
invalidated. Additionally, because the sole identification of Mr. 
Anderson was eyewitness testimony, the objective evidence of 
fingerprints creates a probability that a "reasonable jury would 
have had a reasonable doubt" concerning the identity of Mr. 
Anderson as the suspect. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 
1991) . 
Mr. Anderson's conviction was based upon erroneous jury 
instructions which allowed a conviction for the robbery of 
Mervyns, a non-natural person. Although the State points out that 
Mervyns is defined as a "person" under section 76-1-601(8) of the 
Utah Criminal Code, that definition does not apply. Mr. Anderson 
was convicted under section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the robbery 
statute, and that section does not use the term "person" to 
describe the victim, but to describe where "personal property" 
must be taken from to constitute robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
301(1) (a) (1999) . Because "personal property" cannot be taken from 
the "person" of Mervyns, the jury instructions allowing a 
conviction for the robbery of Mervyns was error. 
Finally, sufficient evidence of the element of "force or 
fear" was not established at trial, and the trial court erred in 
denying Mr. Anderson's motion for a directed verdict. Section 76-
6-301(1)(a) did not modify the common law definition of the 
element of "force or fear," and under that definition "force or 
fear" cannot be established by force or threatened force used to 
facilitate escape or to retain property. Although other sections 
of the robbery statute specifically modified the common law 
element of "force or fear" to allow for this, section 76-6-
301(1)(a) did not, and the evidence was not sufficient to 
establish Mr. Anderson's conviction under that section. 
Therefore, Mr. Anderson's conviction should be reversed and this 
2 
case should be remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S ASSERTION THAT THE FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS DOES 
NOT RENDER A DIFFERENT RESULT PROBABLE UPON RETRIAL IS NOT 
SUPPORTABLE WHERE THE FINGERPRINT ANALYSIS WAS NOT 
INVALIDATED ON THE RECORD AND THERE WAS NO OBJECTIVE SUPPORT 
OF THE IDENTIFICATION OF MR. ANDERSON AS THE SUSPECT 
Before addressing the State's argument, it is helpful to 
further explore the standard of review applicable to the issue of 
newly discovered evidence.1 The correct standard of review is the 
"abuse of discretion" standard. State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11 ^ [16, 
994 P.2d 1237 (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 
1991)). "A trial court has a wide range of discretion in 
determining whether newly discovered evidence entitles a litigant 
to a new trial." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 
1
 The application of the "abuse of discretion" standard can 
vary depending upon the issue on review. For instance, in 
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of 
prior crimes or bad acts of the defendant, the reviewing court 
determines whether the admission was ""scrupulously examined'" by 
the trial judge. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 fl6, 6 P.3d 
1120 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 47 fl8, 993 P.2d 837). 
However, in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, 
trial courts have ""wide discretion.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
337, 340 (Utah 1997) . With regard to the review of factual 
findings on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, trial 
courts are given a "high level" of discretion. State v. 
Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(citation 
omitted). 
3 
1994) .2 This discretion is abused when the failure to grant a new 
trial "is [not] within the limits of reasonability." Id. 
Specifically, ""[t]o justify a new trial, newly discovered 
evidence should clarify a fact that was contested and resolved 
against the movant, or be sufficiently persuasive that the result 
of the trial might be changed." Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (quoting 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988)).3 
In this case, newly discovered fingerprint evidence 
2
 The "abuse of discretion" standard used in reviewing 
motions for new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence 
has been described as allowing for a ""wide range of 
discretion.'" James, 819 P.2d at 793 (citation omitted). However, 
the standard has also been described as requiring a ""clear 
abuse'" of discretion before a new trial can be granted. State v. 
Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(citation 
omitted); see also State v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1972). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that the decision to grant 
a new trial in the context of newly discovered evidence rests 
within the "sound discretion" of the trial court. State v. 
Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 1942); see also State v. Hawkins, 
16 P.2d 713, 719 (Utah 1932)(citation omitted). 
3
 See also Goddard, 871 P.2d at 545 ("Also, newly discovered 
evidence should clarify a fact that was contested and resolved 
against the movant."); James, 819 P.2d at 795 (The trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial where new 
evidence of a principal witness's perjury gave rise to the 
probability that a reasonable jury would have had reasonable 
doubt whether the defendant had the requisite intent); Jiron, 4 92 
P.2d at 985 ("This court will deem the denial of [a motion for a 
new trial] an abuse of discretion only in such instances where 
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have been miscarried 
because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the 
new evidence will supply . . . " ) ; and State v. Weaver, 6 P.2d 
167, 169-70 (Utah 1931) (The sound discretion of trial court was 
not abused when "[t]he facts to which Ross offers to testify were 
actually before the jury."). 
4 
clarifies that Mr. Anderson was mistakenly identified as the 
suspect who threatened Mervyns employees with a knife. In his 
testimony at trial, Detective Doug McGrath ["Detective McGrath"] 
testified that when he was assigned this case, u[t]here [were] 
several little things in there that made me feel that this was a 
fairly serious offense and that it required a lot of follow-up on 
it to try to determine who the suspect is." R. 478-79. Yet, he 
did not visit Mervyns until four days later, when he picked up 
the video tape. R. 4 94. He did not pick up the shoe box with the 
suspect's old shoes from Mervyns until five days after being 
assigned the case. Id. Additionally, the evidence technician 
collected no evidence at the scene. R. 493-94, R. 500-01, R. 505. 
The sole basis for identification of Mr. Anderson as the 
suspect was the report of Mr. Sam Gonzales, who saw the Mervyns 
video tape on Fox 13 News, R. 480-81, R. 514-15, and subsequent 
photo spread identifications by two of the three Mervyns 
employees who witnessed the incident.4 R. 486-87. Detective 
McGrath testified that the purpose of fingerprinting is to 
confirm the identification of a suspect, R. 488, but the shoe box 
handled by the suspect was not analyzed for fingerprints until 
4
 One employee, Elizabeth Ashdown, who observed the suspect 
for some time on the video camera prior to approaching him as he 
left the store, was unable to identify Mr. Anderson as the 
suspect from the photo line up. R. 397-98, R. 416. 
5 
after Mr. Anderson's trial. R. 487, R. 674 [1-2]. The analysis 
indicates that the shoe box "was examined and found to have been 
processed by Ninhydrin. Some latent fingerprints were visible. . 
. . The latents developed on the box were compared with the 
fingerprints on file in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Crime lab 
for ANDERSON, Michael Ray S0# 0213957. . . . No match was 
found."5 
The State explains that "[t]he absence of a match must be 
considered in its relevant evidentiary context." Appellee's Br. 
13. Because the box was in an open area of the store and handled 
by store employees, Detective McGrath was concerned about 
contamination. R. 488. The State asserts that "[u]nder such 
circumstances, the fact that the one surviving fingerprint on the 
box did not belong to defendant does nothing to either implicate 
or exonerate him from participation in this crime. The most that 
can be gleaned from the evidence is that the solitary 'almost 
complete' print on the box did not belong to defendant." 
5
 The faxed fingerprint analysis, dated 11 February 2000, is 
marked "State's Exhibit S-1" attached to "Defendants Motion for a 
New Trial" and has been properly included with the record. The 
analysis was included in accordance with Mr. Anderson's 
"Supplemental Designation of Record" filed 14 March 2000, which 
requested the attachment of "all documents contained in the file 
in the above-related matter together with the transcript of [the 
hearing on 11 February 2000 for a motion for a new trial]." R. 
692-93. 
6 
Appellee's Br. 13. 
The record does not support these assertions. While 
Detective McGrath did indicate there was a possibility of 
contamination, R. 488, he did not express the opinion that 
contamination invalidated any fingerprint analysis that could be 
conducted. See R. 488, R. 509. Indeed, he was not qualified to 
express such an opinion. R. 503. The fingerprint analysis 
conducted after the trial indicates that there was not one, but 
"some latent fingerprints"6 on the box, and none of these 
belonged to Mr. Anderson.7 The trial court made a finding of fact 
reflecting this. R. 687. There is nothing to support the 
assertion that this does not "exonerate him from participation in 
this crime." Appellee's Br. 13. Additionally, even if evidence of 
contamination had been presented, this would go to the weight of 
evidence, and would not be a basis for exclusion of the 
evidence.8 
6
 State's Exhibit S-l attached to "Defendant's Motion for a 
New Trial." R. 213. 
7
 The fingerprints were not matched with store employees or 
any other person because no attempt was made to do so. R. 674 [2-
3] . 
8
 See State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (u[I]t is within the province of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and 
reject these alternate hypothesis."); State v. Schreuder, 712 
P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1985)(". . . the general rule being that 
uncertainty on the part of an expert goes to weight rather than 
7 
On its face, the new fingerprint evidence gives rise to a 
grave suspicion "that justice may have been miscarried because of 
the lack of enlightenment" on the issue of the identification of 
Mr. Anderson as the suspect in this case. Jiron, 492 P.2d at 985. 
Mr. Anderson was identified solely on the basis of eyewitness 
testimony, R. 480-81, R. 486-87, R. 514-15, without any objective 
evidence to corroborate his identification. The fingerprint 
analysis is crucial to the clarification of this point. 
However, for this Court to reverse Mr. Anderson's conviction 
and remand this case for a new trial, new evidence must not only 
w
"clarify a fact that was contested and resolved against the 
movant,'" Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (citation omitted), but also a 
three-prong test must be met. The State does not contest Mr. 
Anderson's assertion that the second prong of the test has been 
met. Appellee's Br. 11-12 n.4. Additionally, the State argues 
that it is immaterial whether the first prong is met9 because the 
third prong of the test is dispositive. Appellee's Br. 11-12 n.4. 
The third prong is that the new evidence ""must be such as 
to render a different result probable on the retrial of the 
to admissibility.") 
9
 The first two prongs require that the proffered evidence 
xx
"(i) [] could not, with reasonable diligence, have been 
discovered and produced at trial; (ii) it is not merely 
cumulative . . . .'" Loose, 2000 UT 11 ^16 (citation omitted). 
8 
case.'" Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994)(citation omitted). 
"When 'new' evidence merely tends to impeach or discredit the 
testimony of a witness [] a new trial need not be granted." 
Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (citing Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851). But 
where the new evidence creates a probability that a "reasonable 
jury would have had a reasonable doubt" as to a crucial element 
of the case, even though there may be sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction, a new trial should be granted. James, 819 
P.2d at 795.10 
Here the fingerprint analysis does not merely tend to 
impeach the testimony of a witness, it casts "reasonable doubt" 
upon the identification of Mr. Anderson as the suspect who 
threatened Mervyns employees with a knife. At trial, Detective 
McGrath described how Mr. Anderson was identified. " [A] s I looked 
at the video [from Mervyns], the portion of it where the suspect 
turns and faces the camera before he goes out the door, I looked 
at it and I thought, well, gee, if somebody knew who that guy 
was, if they seen that portion of the tape, they would be able to 
say who it is. Maybe myself or the store clerks think it looks 
10
 See also Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125 ("Where disinterested 
testimony on the vital point in a case is very scant, newly 
discovered testimony on that point appearing from affidavits in 
support of the motion for a new trial to be apparently reliable . 
. . and it appears likely that such evidence would change the 
result, a new trial should be granted."). 
9 
funny, but to me, if I knew that person prior to the incident I 
would be able to say, yeah, I know who that is." R. 479. The 
eyewitness identification was made after the video tape was aired 
over Fox 13 News. R. 480-81, R. 514-15, R. 486-87. 
Eyewitness identification of a suspect is subjective and 
open for mistake,11 and the identification of Mr. Anderson is not 
corroborated by any other evidence. Additionally, as Detective 
McGrath testified, the case ''required a lot of follow-up on it to 
try to determine who the suspect is," R. 479, and the video made 
the suspect "look[] funny" to those unfamiliar with him. R. 479. 
Under these circumstances, the eyewitness identification of Mr. 
Anderson as the suspect is subject to reasonable doubt in light 
of the fingerprint analysis, which could not match Mr. Anderson's 
fingerprints with any of those on the box. Therefore, the new 
fingerprint evidence renders ""a different result probable on the 
retrial of the case.'" Goddard, 871 P.2d at 545 (citation 
omitted). 
11
 The potential for inaccuracy in eyewitness identification 
is discussed in Aplt. Br. 23-24. 
10 
II. UNDER THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THE 
DEFINITION OF "PERSON" RELIED UPON BY THE STATE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE 
CONTEXT OF 
BECAUSE THE 
DESCRIBING 
TERM 
THE 
"PERSON" 
VICTIM, IT 
IS 
IS 
NOT 
USED 
USED 
TO 
IN THE 
DESCRIBE 
WHERE "PERSONAL PROPERTY" MUST BE TAKEN FROM TO CONSTITUTE A 
SECTION 76-6-301 (1) (a) ROBBERY 
Mr. Anderson's conviction was based upon erroneous jury 
instructions which inaccurately characterized the elements of 
robbery under section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the Utah Criminal Code. 
In particular, the jury was improperly instructed on the elements 
of: "person, or immediate presence" and "against [the victim's] 
will." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1)(a).12 These elements 
contemplate that the victim of robbery is a natural person. See 
Aplt Br. 30-32. However, the jury instructions indicated that 
these elements included a taking of "personal property then in 
the possession of Mervyns from the person or immediate presence 
of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns" 
if such taking was "against the will of Sharlotte Billings, Ann 
Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns . . ." R. 173. See Aplt. Br. 
28-30. Because these instructions allowed for the conviction of 
Mr. Anderson based upon the characterization of Mervyns as the 
victim, these instructions are erroneous. 
12
 Section 76-6-301(1) indicates that "[a] person commits 
robbery if: (a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or 
attempts to take personal property in the possession of another 
from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by 
means of force or fear . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1999). 
11 
The State replies that these instructions were proper in 
light of the definition of "person" in the Utah Criminal Code. 
Appellee Br, 16. That definition states that u"[p]erson' means an 
individual, public or private corporation, government, 
partnership, or unincorporated association." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-601(8) (1999) . See Appellee Br. 16. 
To determine whether this definition applies to section 76-
6-301(1)(a), we must apply the rules of statutory construction.13 
We begin by "examining the plain language of the applicable 
statutes and apply other methods of statutory interpretation only 
when the language is either ambiguous or inconsistent." State v. 
Westerman, 945 P.2d at 696.14 In examining the plain language, 
"it is a 'fundamental principal of statutory construction (and . 
. . of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be 
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in 
which it is used.'" Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313 (citation omitted).15 
13
 The correct standard of review on the issue of statutory 
construction is a review for correctness. When a "trial court's 
order is premised on statutory interpretation, as it is here, we 
afford the trial court's interpretation no deference and review 
for correctness." State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
14
 See also State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995); 
State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
15
 See also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 
1045 (Utah 1991) ("[A] statute should not be construed in a 
12 
Further, "statutory provisions should be construed to give full 
effect to all their terms." State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 
(Utah 1992). 
Taken in its entire context, with full effect given to all 
its terms, section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the robbery statute 
contemplates that the victim is natural person and the statutory 
definition relied upon by the State does not apply. Section 76-6-
301(1) (a) does not use the term "person" in the context of 
defining who the victim must be. The victim is not described as a 
"person" but as "another." The only time the word "person" is 
used is when the statute describes where the personal property 
must be taken from. The statute indicates that robbery is 
committed if the robber takes "personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a) (emphasis added) . Thus, the 
"person" or "immediate presence" is where the personal property 
must be taken from, and "another" is who the property must be 
taken from. This reading is the "plain language" reading of the 
statute, see Westermanf 945 P.2d at 696, and accords with the 
statute's natural sentence structure and the context of the 
words. See Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313. 
piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole"). 
13 
Further, if the statute was interpreted to mean that 
"person, or immediate presence" described the victim rather than 
where "personal property" must be taken from, full effect would 
not be given to all of the terms of the statute. See Vigil, 842 
P.2d at 845. The term "another" would become superfluous. 
"'Whenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no 
portion is superfluous,' and, as such they should not be read to 
include a pure redundancy." State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 
278 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Beynon v. St. George-Dixie 
Lodge # 1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n.21 (Utah 1993)). 
Additionally, the words "person, or immediate presence" if 
interpreted as describing the victim, would take on a generalized 
meaning as described in the definition of "person" cited by the 
State. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(8) (1999) . In the plain 
language and context of the statute, however, the word "person" 
takes on the more specific meaning of the human body.16 As 
indicated in Wharton's Criminal Law, " [i]t is largely self-
evident when property is taken "from the person' of another." 4 
Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 458 (15th ed. 1996). 
One of the definitions of "person" in Merriam Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary is "b: the body of a human being; also: the 
body and clothing <unlawful search of the ~> . . . ." Merriam-
Webster, Incorporated, Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 
867 (10th ed. 1997) . 
14 
This specific meaning of "person" applies instead of the 
statutory definition of "person" located in section 76-1-601(8) 
because "specific statutory provisions take precedence over 
general statutory provisions." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 845. 
The jury was given incorrect instructions in this case 
because the instructions described the possessor of the "personal 
property" as Mervyns, a non-natural person. R. 173. This 
contradicts the plain meaning of the statute, which uses the term 
"another," to describe the victim of a section 76-6-301(1) (a) 
robbery. "Another" necessarily refers to a natural person because 
"personal property in the possession of another" cannot be taken 
from the "person" of a corporation, business entity, or any other 
non-natural person. See Wharton's Criminal Law § 458 (15th ed. 
1996) . 
Additionally, the jury instructions incorrectly indicated 
that the elements of a section 76-6-301(1) (a) robbery included 
taking "from the person or immediate presence of Sharlotte 
Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth Ashdown of Mervyns" if such taking 
was "against the will of Sharlotte Billings, Ann Majdi, Elizabeth 
Ashdown of Mervyns . . ." R. 173. Although, as the state points 
out, these employees "were acting within the scope of their 
employment" when they were threatened with a knife, Appellee Br. 
17, the victim of a section 76-6-301(1) (a) robbery must be a 
15 
natural person. Because Mervyns is not a natural person, this 
case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. See State 
v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991). 
III. BECAUSE THE ELEMENT OF "FORCE OR FEAR" REQUIRED TO 
ESTABLISH ROBBERY AT COMMON LAW DID NOT INCLUDE FORCE OR 
THREATENED FORCE USED TO FACILITATE ESCAPE OR RETAIN 
PROPERTY, AND THE COMMON LAW WAS NOT MODIFIED BY SECTION 76-
6-301(1) (a) , SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS NOT PRESENTED WHERE 
EMPLOYEES WERE THREATENED AFTER THE SUSPECT LEFT THE STORE 
Because the evidence, fully marshaled, is not sufficient to 
establish aggravated robbery under sections 76-6-301(1) (a) and 
76-6-302(1) of the Utah Criminal Code, the trial court erred in 
denying Mr. Anderson's motion for a directed verdict based upon 
insufficient evidence. See Aplt. Br. 35-39. The State counters 
that the denial was not error because Utah has adopted the 
"transaction" approach to the crime of robbery, and sufficient 
evidence was presented to convict Mr. Anderson under this 
approach. Appellee Br. 19-24. In its argument, the State relies 
upon D.B. v. State, which held that "if force or fear is used at 
any time prior to or concurrent with the victim actually losing 
the ability to control his chattel, then a robbery has occurred." 
D.B., 925 P.2d at 182 (footnote omitted). See Appellee Br. 21-24. 
However, as this Court stated in D.B. v. State, that case 
was one uof first impression in Utah and quite probably one of 
16 
last impression as the Utah Legislature amended the robbery 
statute in 1995 shortly after the incident in this case took 
place." D.B., 925 P.2d at 180. The State argues that the 
alteration of the statute is immaterial. Appellee Br. 22-23. The 
State points out that the defendant in D.B. v. State had argued 
that the amendment of the statute indicated the previous version 
Mid not encompass a transactional approach to robbery," D.B., 
925 P.2d at 181, and that argument was rejected by this Court. 
Appellee Br. 23. 
Under the rules of statutory interpretation, the holding in 
D.B. v. State does not apply.17 The Utah Code indicates that this 
State has adopted "[t]he common law of England so far as it was 
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or laws 
of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this state . 
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1999). However, the "provisions 
and all proceedings under" our state statutes "are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance 
17
 Additionally, since the amendment of the robbery statute, 
D.B. v. State has not been followed. D.B. v. State has been 
mentioned in two cases, State v. Hollen, 1999 Ut. App. 123 f^ 10 
n.2, 982 P.2d 90, in which the issue of a "completed taking" was 
not reached, and State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), which cited D.B. for principals of general statutory 
interpretation. 
17 
between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in 
reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail." 
Utah Code Arm. § 68-3-2 (1999). The Utah Supreme Court has 
likewise indicated that "where a conflict arises between the 
common law and a statute or constitutional law, the common law 
must yield." Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 
1337 (Utah 1982). On the other hand, xx[s]tatutes are not to be 
construed as effecting change in the common law beyond that which 
is clearly indicated," Home v. Home, 737 P. 2d 244, 248 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987), and when the common law is consistent with 
statutory construction, it applies. Debridge v. Mutual Protective 
Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 793-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).18 
An examination of the common law reveals that the use of 
force or intimidation in escape, or in retaining personal 
property taken from another, does not supply the element of 
"force or fear" necessary for robbery. Robbery, 76 Am. Jur. 2d § 
28. Specifically, xx [a] t common law, and in some states, force or 
threatened force (putting a victim in fear of injury) amounts to 
robbery only if it is used to 'take' property from the possession 
of another. Force or threatened force used thereafter, in order 
18
 See also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 
1045 (Utah 1991) ("It is also proper in construing a statute 
which deals with tort claims to interpret the statute in accord 
with relevant tort law.") 
18 
to retain possession of the property taken or to facilitate 
escape, does not qualify. At best, in such a case, the separate 
offenses of larceny and assault or larceny and battery are 
committed." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 4 63 
(15th ed. 1996)(Footnotes omitted). However, the element of force 
or fear can be extended by statute to include the use of force or 
threatened force "to 'retain' possession of the property." Id., 
see also Robbery, 76 Am. Jur. 2d § 28. 
The common law element of "force or fear" was not extended 
by section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the Utah Criminal Code. That section 
indicates that robbery is committed if "the person unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the 
possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, by means of force or fear . . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-301(1) (a) (1999). The plain language19 of the statute 
indicates that, to constitute robbery, the robber must "take . . 
. by means of force or fear . . . ." There is no qualifying or 
extending language in the statute to indicate that the 
legislature intended20 to extend the common law element of "force 
19
 Statutory interpretation always begins "by examining the 
plain language of the applicable statutes . . . ." State v. 
Westerman, 945 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
20
"Our primary aim is to ascertain and effectuate the 
Legislature's intent." State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 
19 
or fear" by including force or threatened force to retain 
property or facilitate escape. Often, robbery statutes which 
extend the element of "force or fear" do so by the use of 
language such as xxin the course of,"21 "in perpetration,"22 or "to 
'carry away.'"23 In the absence of qualifying or extending 
language, the rules of statutory interpretation require the 
application of the common law. Therefore, the element of "force 
or fear" required by section 76-6-301(1)(a) does not include 
force or threatened force used to escape or retain possession of 
property. 
Part of the current robbery statute specifically allows for 
the conviction of defendants under the "transaction" theory of 
robbery advocated by the State. See Appellee Br. 19. Section 76-
6-301(1) (b) allows for the conviction of defendants who use 
"force or fear of immediate force against another in the course 
of committing a theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (b) . "Course 
of committing a theft" is defined as "an attempt to commit theft, 
1995) (citation omitted) . 
21
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2) (1999) . 
22
 Robbery, 67 Am. Jur. 2d § 28. 
23
 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 463 (15th ed. 
1996)(Citing statutes from Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Minnesotta, New Hampshire, New York, Washington, 
and the Model Penal Code. Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
301 (2) is cited) . 
20 
commission of theft, or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(2). This clearly 
modifies the common law element of "force or fear," which did not 
allow for a robbery conviction if force or threat of force was 
used solely to facilitate escape or retain the property. 
However, such a modification is not indicated in section 76-
6-301(1)(a), which is at issue here. On its face, and applying 
the "plain reading" analysis, the lack of a specific modification 
of the common law rule in section 76-6-301(1) (a) indicates that 
this section applies only to those situations in which a robber 
takes personal property from a natural person by means of "'any 
physical act directed against a person as a means of gaining 
control of property.'" 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal 
Law § 460 (15th ed. 1996)(Footnote omitted). This is entirely 
consistent with common law robbery which, by definition, is 
classified "not only as an offense against property but also as 
an offense against the person." 4 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's 
Criminal Law § 454 (15th ed. 1996) (Footnote omitted) . In this 
case, sufficient evidence of "force or fear" used concurrently 
with the taking of personal property, as required by section 76-
6-301(1)(a), was not presented. 
Because sufficient evidence of the element of "force or 
fear" was not established at trial, see Aplt. Br. 35-39, the 
21 
trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Anderson's motion for a 
directed verdict. This Court reverses u"a jury verdict only when, 
after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in 
a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that "the evidence 
to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight 
and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust.' w/ State v. Rudolph, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 155 ^22, 3 P.3d 
192 (citing State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, Kl9, 999 P.2d 565 
(citation omitted)). Here, there was no evidence of the required 
element of "force or fear" because no threat occurred until the 
suspect was making his escape. See Aplt. Br. 35-36. Therefore, 
Mr. Anderson is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a 
remand for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests a reversal of his 
conviction and a remand for a new trial on the basis of the post-
trial fingerprint analysis performed on the shoe box handled by 
the suspect. The analysis could not match Mr. Anderson's 
fingerprints with any of those on the box, and this new evidence 
renders ""a different result probable on the retrial of the 
case.'" State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). Additionally, the jury was incorrectly instructed on 
22 
the elements of robbery under section 76-6-301(1)(a) of the Utah 
Criminal Code because the instructions erroneously contemplated 
that the victim of a 76-6-301(1)(a) robbery could be a non-
natural person. This error should be remedied by a reversal of 
Mr. Anderson's conviction and remand for a new trial. See State 
v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) . Finally, because no 
evidence of the required element of "force or fear" was 
presented, Mr. Anderson is entitled to a reversal and a remand 
for a new trial on the basis of insufficient evidence. 
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